When looking at US attempts to strengthen its defense ties with its Indo-Pacific partners, it is commonly accepted that the Australia-US relationship is one of the easiest solutions to find. There are good reasons for this view. One is the long and deep history of the alliance, which Australians regularly refer to as the “foundation” of Canberra’s security policy. Another reason is Australia’s emphasis on strengthening the US military presence at a time of increased great power competition. And the third is the AUKUS agreement, which promises to provide the United States with Virginia-class nuclear weapons. submarines to the Royal Australian Navyas well as deepening collaboration in the development of next-generation defense technologies.

But it would be a big mistake to think that there are no challenges in deepening US-Australian defense integration. For example, Canberra and Washington tend to view challenges in the Indo-Pacific region through different lenses of a strategic telescope. Certainly, both see China as the main threat (or “stimulus challenge,” to use the American term), and both consider that the main area to secure is the maritime domain. Yet they differ on the question of where the most likely location for future conflict might be: the United States is focused on Taiwan and a potential war on the high seas; while Australia sees the main challenge as thwarting efforts to deny it access to sea routes of communication and trade.

In other words, the United States views the risk of war in high-end terms, extending over vast maritime distances; while for Australia, the main tasks of its much smaller armed forces are more local and coastal.

There are other potential points of disjunction as well. Australia does not outsource sovereign decisions about whether to go to war, and its differing interests shape its perception of threats. Indeed, even if there is broad bipartisan consensus on the value of the alliance, this does not automatically translate into an Australian willingness to follow Washington without question in every conflict. A good example is Taiwan, where Australian domestic debates fail to reach consensus on whether the defense of Taipei is a vital national interest.

Fortunately, Washington and Canberra can take clear steps to better align their mutual defense postures. This is made easier by the fact that the two nations remain closely aligned in their strategic outlook. Importantly, we consider that this task is much easier to accomplish if targeted in terms of the specific effects that the United States and Australia seek to generate, rather than by adapting often amorphous terms like “integrated deterrence.” “.

When examining the desired effects of the United States and Australia’s security and defense alignment, three areas stand out. The first concerns the resources, or capabilities that both countries can bring to bear in future crises. Here, although Australia has rapidly developed its capacity to acquire long-range strike weapons in order to put its adversaries at risk, it must be recognized that Australia will be able to contribute very little additional in terms of ability to deter China in the short term. .

Even when Australia’s capabilities are enhanced through AUKUS, in at least a decade its forces will be far better suited to greenwater deterrence. Therefore, strengthening the capacity of the US and Australian militaries to conduct joint operations in the land and maritime domains would be an important step towards closer alignment. So would stronger US support for Australia’s proximity advantage over South Pacific island nations, which will continue to be aggressively courted by China through proposals for investment partnerships and security. And finally, developing the capacity to better respond to Chinese hybrid operations below the threshold in a maritime context – in particular by articulating a more convincing regional discourse on the need to respect international law and strategic stability – would make it possible to better anchor maritime operations joint Australian and American operations, particularly in the South China Sea.

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Australia and the United States should also pay attention to relationships with other regional players. Of course, there are obstacles to regional balance: India, for example, is less interested in countering Chinese power in East Asia than in mainland South Asia and the Indian Ocean; and many ASEAN states view China as a crucial player for their future prosperity.

Yet opportunities exist in promoting “door-to-door” cooperation among the United States’ bilateral security partners. These include Japan and the Republic of Korea, both of which have gradually come to terms with the idea that it makes sense to invest in maintaining regional security order. Here, deepening strategic alignment between Japan and Australia through scenario planning, intensifying the ROK’s participation in Australia-hosted military exercises, and strengthening cooperation through flexible minilateral agreements like AP4 would be steps in the right direction. But more effort should also be made to strengthen Australia-Indonesia relations in a way that takes into account Jakarta’s preferences for non-alignment, but nevertheless seeks to establish agreements on future contingencies in which the Indonesia (and perhaps also Brunei) could authorize the transit, overflight and resupply of Australian and American military assets.

Finally, the United States and Australia should seek to build resilience regionally. This could incorporate a number of initiatives: a more catholic approach to intelligence sharing with selected partners; cooperation on high-end technologies (especially AI) with advanced countries like Singapore; develop standards of behavior in the maritime, space and cyber domains; and more consistently push back against disinformation efforts around AUKUS and U.S. alliances in general, which currently remain largely unchallenged.

Together, these three rounds of cooperation will help Australia and the United States better align their defense policies to achieve significant impact. They will make better use of the specific capabilities of each partner; leverage regional relationships more effectively; and contribute to supporting a security order more resistant to external pressures. More importantly, they represent a logical development in a close defense and security relationship, closely related, but driven by considerations that are naturally not identical.

Matthew Sussex is an Associate (Adjunct) Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University; a researcher at the Institute for Regional Security (IFRS); Visiting Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies at the Australian National University (ANU); and visiting fellow at the Center for European Studies, ANU. He was previously a senior research fellow at the Australian Defense College; and Associate Professor and Academic Director at the National Security College, ANU.

Peter Tesch served as Deputy Secretary for Strategy, Policy and Industry in the Australian Department of Defense from 2019 to 2022. During his thirty-two year career at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, he served as Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2016-19), Ambassador to Germany (2009-2013) and Head of the International Security Division (2014-2015). He also served as Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York (2002-05).