“Extraordinarily, he (Yoweri Museveni) asked me to convey to the Foreign Office my impressions on the strength of the NRA (National Resistance Army). In particular, I was to inform them that the NRA only needed one million rounds of 7.62mm to end the war. He said 2,000 AK-47s and 2,000 68mm mortar rounds would be useful but not essential. If the British government wanted to assess the strength of the NRA, then it could send a secret agent there,” wrote Mr. William Pike in his book: Combatants: A Memoir of the Bush War and the Press in Uganda.

It was 1984; the quote was on page 84.

It seemed that rebel Museveni was offering his army, the NRA, to the British in a sort of “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours” arrangement. Later this offer, if you like, crystallized in the form of shared political dividends for both Mr Museveni and the British.

“I spent hours talking with Ugandan Yoweri Museveni, this former bush fighter who is so important to the peace of the region, from Somalia to Congo to Sudan. He is crucial. Even if we can disapprove of some of his prejudices,” writes former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in his new memoir, Unleashed.

There are two ways to summarize these two quotes.

First, Mr Museveni made a sort of Faustian bargain that he would protect British interests if they recognized the trouble he had taken in preserving his power. He would thus become a sub-imperialist. Whatever he gained would reflect his selfish desire for power. While the Devil, the Ugandans, could take over. That would be cynical, worthy of an Uncle Tom.

The second possibility, in summarizing these quotes, would reveal Mr. Museveni as the supreme strategist, playing the long game. Here, he would use the British to consolidate not only his personal power plans, but also his country’s position in the geostrategic scheme of things. By making the British believe he is working for them, he could secretly be working for his country.

Buganda did this at the dawn of Uganda’s protectorate status. The kingdom made the British believe that it exclusively served their interests. But several disagreements between Mengo and Whitehall then led to the Kabaka crisis in 1953.

Before that, the administrative stamp of Buganda was present throughout Uganda. Other areas of the protectorate became carbon copies of Buganda when it came to civic education. This is why my maternal grandfather was called Chief Saza in the bureaucratic idiom of the Buganda Kingdom.

As a result, Buganda statecraft spread across the country. Thus, we saw Buganda outwit the British and steal the march on all other parts of Uganda.

Mr Museveni could also have used the British to consolidate his position, a prelude to realizing a wider altruistic vision. Then, having unwittingly co-opted the British into his plans, he could later turn on them when he was strong enough to do so. With this in mind, he would achieve with his NRA what Kwame Nkrumah failed to achieve with his Office of African Affairs on the African scene.

I wish that was the case. But so much has happened since 1986. And it has convinced some of us that Mr Museveni is more interested in his own power than in the prestige of Africa.

This makes him more of a Moïse Tshombe than a Patrice Lumumba. This could also explain why he stayed in power for so long.

If this is true, Uganda needs divine intervention.