James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock The calculation of consent– published over sixty years ago in 1962 – is one of the most influential books applying economic ideas to politics. The authors were by no means libertarian, but they were mostly in favor of a limited state and the free market. Another point in their favor was that both authors read my book reviews. In this week’s column, I’ll touch on some points of interest from the book, some of which haven’t received as much attention as they deserve.

The authors are strong supporters of methodological individualism and cite the work of Ludwig von Mises. Human action to defend this point of view. Actions must always be traced to individual decisions, and they reject “organic” conceptions of the state that see the state as acting independently of individuals.

So much is well known, but one issue that has not received enough attention is their use of methodological individualism to criticize Marx’s theory of history. Marx views classes as groups that act as whole entities and fails to show how individuals are motivated to act in accordance with their supposed class interests. They criticize historian Charles A. Beard for using Marx’s theory to interpret American history. A more realistic view, they suggest, would view individuals belonging to different Marxist classes as allies in obtaining government favor. They pose the problem this way:

The point that has been largely overlooked is that it remains perfectly appropriate to assume that men are motivated by considerations of utility while rejecting the economic determinism implicit in the entire Marxist school of thought. Differences in utility functions arise as much from differences in taste as anything else. The class status of the individual in the production process is one of the least important determinants of genuine economic interest. The phenomenon of unions and textile companies joining together to exert political pressure for a ban on Japanese imports is far more familiar on today’s American scene than any general political activity of labor, capital, or interests land.

Let’s move on to another topic that has caused a lot of controversy. Does support for the free market imply support for open borders? Buchanan and Tulloch don’t think so. According to them, this will tend to generate conflicts between people and make agreement on common projects more difficult. For the same reason, it is better to have a small state than a large one. They say about this:

It seems reasonable to expect that a group composed of members with markedly different external characteristics will invest more in negotiation than in a group composed of approximately homogeneous members. Increased uncertainty about the tastes and negotiating skills of one’s peers will lead the individual to be more stubborn in their own efforts. When he knows his peers better, the individual will be less stubborn in his negotiations, and this for perfectly rational reasons. The overall costs of decision making will be lower, given any collective choice rules, in communities characterized by a reasonably homogeneous population than in those characterized by a heterogeneous population.

So far I have focused on topics on which the authors reach conclusions that will please Rothbardians. But there are subjects that go decidedly in the opposite direction. Buchanan and Tulloch are moral skeptics (that is, they do not believe that the rules of morality are objectively true). Individuals attracted to views like natural law who accept objective morality can use these views to construct personal morality, but they have no place in politics. Rothbardians, in contrast, hold that the ethics that delineate an appropriate legal system are part of the objective morality that deals with the permissible use of force.

Buchanan and Tulloch say in this regard that “it should not be surprising that the most “sympathetic” or “sympathetic” works are found among the “realists” in the history of political doctrine. First, we turn to Glaucon in Plato’s book. Republicto Thomas Hobbes and Benedict Spinoza.

Although they recognize that individuals can be influenced by moral ideals, they generally believe that people – in both economics and politics – aim to make as much money as possible. Morally driven people – whom they often call “Kantians” – will tend to allow themselves to be exploited by their less scrupulous comrades in society and, reluctant to be “suckers,” will compromise their ideals. Everything has a price, including morality.

This vision leads to what constitutes both a strength and a weakness of their conception of politics. Members of government do not seek power over others for its own sake, but rather view political office as a means of acquiring money. This is a strength because it leads them to have a skeptical view of politicians: they are not “public servants”, eager to pursue the “common good”, but no better than anyone else. But it is also a weakness, because they think that politicians are no worse than others. History clearly shows that they are much worse.

I don’t want to end on a negative note. Although they accept the notion of “public goods”, rather than radically rejecting it in the manner of Rothbard, they at least recognize that these goods do not need to be provided by the state. Often individuals can voluntarily provide the good themselves, and in such cases they will frequently prefer private agreement to state provision. Unfortunately, they don’t think it’s always the rational solution, but at least it’s better than nothing.