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The American world order could end
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The American world order could end

Americans voted for change in this week’s presidential election, and when it comes to foreign policy, they will certainly get it. Donald Trump has demonstrated disregard for the priorities and precedents that have traditionally guided Washington’s approach to the world. He speaks more fondly of America’s autocratic adversaries than of his Democratic allies. He derides “globalism” as a liberal conspiracy against the American people. And he regards international agreements as mere waste paper.

At stake is not just the survival of Ukraine and the fate of Gaza, but the entire international system that constitutes the foundation of American global power. This system relies on American military power, but more than that, it is rooted in relationships and ideals: nations with common values ​​coming together under American leadership to deter authoritarian aggression and defend democracy. The resulting world order may be very flawed and error-prone, but it has also generally preserved global stability since the end of World War II.

Despite its sustainability, this system is fragile. It is based on the American promise to respect its commitments and to ensure collective defense. Trump threatens this promise. His plan to impose high tariffs on all imports could disrupt the liberal economic order that many American factories and farmers (and Trump’s billionaire cronies) rely on. His apparent willingness to sacrifice Ukraine to Russian President Vladimir Putin in a misguided quest for peace will strain the Atlantic alliance and undermine security in Europe. By signaling that he will not defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, he could undermine trust in the United States throughout Asia and make regional war more likely.

The American world order could end. This would not be a question of “American decline”. The U.S. economy will likely remain the largest and most important in the world for the foreseeable future. But if Washington breaks its promises, or even if its allies and enemies believe it has or will – or if it fails to uphold democracy and the rule of law at home – the pillars of the American international system will collapse and the United States will suffer. an immeasurable loss of influence and prestige on a global scale.

The risk of this happening has been increasing for some time. George W. Bush’s unilateral war on terrorism has strained the international system. So did Trump’s differences with NATO and other close allies during his first term. But world leaders may view Washington’s hesitations as temporary deviations from what has been a relatively consistent approach to foreign policy for decades. They understand the changing nature of American politics. In four years there will be new elections and a new administration could restore Washington’s usual priorities.

But with Trump’s re-election, this aberration has become the new norm. The American people have told the world that they no longer wish to support an American-led world order. They have chosen American policymakers who promise to focus on the home front rather than the problems of ungrateful allies. Perhaps they concluded that the United States spent too many lives and too much money on unsuccessful foreign adventures, like those in Vietnam and Afghanistan. And perhaps now America will reevaluate its priorities in light of new threats, particularly those from China, and the potential burden of managing them.

The problem is that if the United States doesn’t want to lead the world, other countries will, and a number of them are already applying for the job. One of them is Putin’s Russia. Another example is Xi Jinping’s China.

China began asserting its global leadership more aggressively during Trump’s first term and has worked even harder to undermine the American system since then – strengthening China’s ties with Russia and other authoritarian states, by building a coalition to counterbalance the West and promoting illiberal principles for a reformed system. world order. Trump seems to believe he can control China through personal charm alone. When asked in a recent interview if he would intervene militarily if Xi blocked Taiwan, he replied: “I wouldn’t have to, because he respects me.”

This is narcissism, not deterrence. It is more likely that Putin and Xi will take advantage of Trump’s disinterest. Once pacified in Ukraine, Putin could very well rebuild his army with the help of China, North Korea and Iran, then move on to his next victim, say Georgia or Poland. Xi could be emboldened to invade Taiwan, or at least spark a crisis on the island to extract concessions from a U.S. president who has already suggested he won’t fight.

The result will not simply be a multipolar world. It is inevitable, whatever Washington does. It will be a world order in which autocrats prey on small states that can no longer count on the support of the global superpower, where regional rivalries erupt into conflicts, where economic nationalism upends global trade, and where new nuclear threats emerging. This world will not be safe for democracy or American prosperity.

The fate of the world order and the global power of the United States may seem unimportant to Americans struggling to pay their bills. But a world hostile to American interests will constrain American businesses, undermine international energy markets, and endanger jobs and economic growth. Americans may face larger wars that require greater sacrifices (like in 1941).

Perhaps Trump will surprise everyone by reflecting on his legacy and choosing not to pursue the path he has outlined. But that seems unlikely. His messages about his foreign policy priorities have remained too consistent for too long. Over the next four years, Americans will have to decide whether they still want the United States to be a great power and, if so, what kind of great power they want it to be. Americans wanted change. The world could pay the price.